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CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL BAIL BOND CONTRACTS:
PROTECTING PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts are often confronted with the difficult choice of law
problem of whether to apply federal law or state law to a particular
controversy.' The issue arises when Congress fails to indicate its in-
tent as to which law applies. 2  In filling in the statutory interstices,
1. Frequently the decision is a close one. Miree v. DeKalb County. 433 U.S.
25, 35 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders. 617 F.2d
1112, 1124 (5th Cir. 1980); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242. 1248 (2d Cir.). cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Dalton Motors, Inc. v. Weaver. 446 F. Supp. 711, 712
(D. Minn. 1978) ("In the absence of congressional legislation or authorized adminis-
trative regulations, the propriety of a court ... applying federal conlmon law in-
volves a difficult balance of federal and state interests."). See generally Friendly. In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33
(1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Comnpetence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision. 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957);
Note, The Federal Common Law. 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Common Law]; Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules
of Decision, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1084 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Competence of Fed-
eral Courts]; Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A
Proposed Test, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Adopting State
Law]; Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits. 69 Yale L.J. 1428 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Rules of Decision]. Choice of law problems arising under federal
regulatory programs often raise difficult problems. See generally Hill, Tile Law-
Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption. 67 Coluin. L. Rev.
1024 (1967); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953);
Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determinations. 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1350
(1959); Note, Federal Housing Loans: Is State Mortgage Laic Preempted. 19 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 431 (1979). Choice of law must be distinguished from the concept of
conflicts of laws. Conflicts of laws involves a horizontal (state-state) choice of law. "A
[state-state] conflict of laws problem arises when as to a litigated issue there are
relevant occurrences in two or more jurisdictions, and . . .the law affecting the sub-
stantive rights of the parties differs. In order to decide the case, the court must
choose which law should be applied. This is done according to the choice of law rules
of the forum." Paul & Pain, Choice of Law in Life Insurance Litigation. 6 Forum 1,
1 (1970). Choice of law in the context of conflict of laws relates to a choice between
different state laws. For general discussions of conflicts of law principles, see A.
Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962); R. Leflar, Americam Conflicts
Law (3d ed. 1977); G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1963); R.
Weintraub, Commentary on The Conflict of Laws (1971). When the phrase "choice of
law" is used in this Note, it refers to the initial choice between federal or state law
which has been termed "vertical (state-federal) choice of law." Broad, Federal Coln-
mon Law: Protecting State Interests. Fed. B.J.. Spring. 1978. at 1. This initial choice
of law decision is the primary focus of this Note.
2. If Congressional legislation does not specifically cover the issue in question.
federal courts are faced with two distinct issues in deciding what should be the gov-
erning rule of decision in choice of law cases. First, the decision must be made
whether federal interests are sufficiently implicated to require the protection of fed-
eral law. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.. 412 U.S. 5S0, 59-2-93
(1973); Rules of Decision, supra note 1. at 1442. If they are not. state law governs
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the Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,3 has recognized
that our federal structure evinces such a deep respect for the statu-
tory and decisional law of the states that state law is presumed to
govern the substantive issues of the litigation. 4  Because the usurpa-
tion of state law poses a significant threat to "the balance of state-
nation relationships," 5 state law "should not be displaced without ex-
press congressional decision or clearly recognized federal need."
and the court is bound to follow precedent within the forum, as required under Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1976). See pt. II infra. If it is determined that state law is to govern of its own
force, see, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977) United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 358 (1966); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'ni v. Par-
nell, 352 U.S. 29, 32-:34 (1956), it is not a discretionary choice of law decision be-
cause the court has no competence to do otherwise. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at
803-04. If state law is chosen the court must then analyze and apply the law of the
state. On the other hand, if federal law is chosen the second step would require
"formulation" of the governing rule of decision. The crucial distinction between
"competence to choose and the actual choosing, and the independence of the two
matters has not always been perceived" by the courts. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 803.
Although a court choosing to apply federal law may look to state law in forinulating
its rule of decision, e.g , United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1979) (lien priority); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957) (labor law); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296-97 (1911)
(contract law); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52
(1939) (tax law), it is not bound to do so. If the federal court does choose to rely oil
state law as the federal rule of decision, the law of the forum is said to be "adopted"
as the federal rule. The choice of law, however, is nonetheless deemed to be federal.
"State law, even if adopted as the content of the federal rule, does not govern of its
own force, but only by virtue of its incorporation as the federal law." Adopting State
Law, supra note 1, at 825-26 (footnote omitted). It has been urged that the state rule
should be adopted where the application of a federal rule would interfere with the
state's interests. Id. at 842; see United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1976).
United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975). If state law is not
adopted as the governing federal rule of decision, the court must formulate a rule of
decision by looking to an "incredible variety of materials." Federal Common Law,
supra note 1, at 1519. These would include considerations of equity and conve-
nience, Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1939),
"principles of established . . . jurisprudence," D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring), "general contract law," Priebe & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947), and all other traditional sources.
United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1978).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Id. at 78; Mishkin, supra note 1, at 800. see notes 21-35 infra and accom-
panying text.
5. Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 1512. See generally Competen'e of
Federal Courts, supra note 1; see also Broad, supra 'note 1, at 3 ("Where the federal
concern is to prevent the choice of certain rules without foreclosing other potential
state selections, there is no justification for taking the primary decision away from the
states.").
6. Broad, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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In light of the principles of federalism, a court faced with a choice
of law problem must determine whether "clear and substantial in-
terests of the National Government" are present before state law may
be displaced. 7  The absence of clearly enunciated criteria to aid the
court in this determination, ho\¢ever, has led to divergent and incon-
sistent results. 8  The interpretation of federal bail bond contracts by
federal courts is a telling illustration.
A federal bail bond 9 is a three-party contract involving the gov-
7. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); 5ee Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25, 29-33 (1977): Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.. 3S4
U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S 29,
33-34 (1956).
8. Faced with similar circumstances, the Supreme Court and federal courts have
reached differing results due to the nature of the particular federal interests involved.
Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods. Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (19791 (chose federal
law in a SBA transaction) and United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.. 412
U.S. 580 (1973) (applied federal law in a land acquisition agreement concerning a
federal wildlife regulatory program) and Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 318
U.S. 363 (1943) (chose federal law in a controversy involving federal commercial
paper) and United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979) (chose federal law in
an SBA transaction) with Miree v. DeKalb Count
, 
433 U.S. 25 (1977 (state law
chosen in a breach of contract action between the county and a federal agency) and
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (chose the law of forum state to an SBA
loan agreement) and Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell. 352 U.S.
29 (1956) (state law chosen in a controversy involving federal commercial paper) and
First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First S. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 614 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.
1980) (state law chosen in a controversy involving trademarks and trade namesi.
Faced with the lack of guidelines to aid in the determination of what law should be
applied in interpreting the guaranty agreements in Small Business Administration
cases, some lower courts have turned to state law. e.g.. United States v. Krochmal,
318 F. Supp. 148, 151 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. Vince. 270 F. Supp. 591, 594
(E.D. La. 1967), affd per curiam. 394 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 393 U.S.
827 (1968), while another court has applied federal law. United States v. Dubrin. 373
F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (W.D. Tex. 1974). Other decisions simply follow the language of
the guaranty agreement. United States v. Proctor, 504 F.2d 954. 956-57 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Newton Livestock Auction Mkt., Inc., 336 F.2d 673 (10th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Immordino, 386 F. Supp. 611, 615 (D. Colo. 1974),
aff'd, 534 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976).
9. Federal bail conditions and procedures are controlled by the Bail Reform Act
of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-3143, 3146-3152. 3568 (1976). See generally
Bogomolny & Sonnenreich, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Administrative Tail Wag-
ging and Other Legal Problems, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 201 (1969); Miller, The Bail Reformn
Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 Cath. U.L. Rev. 24 (1969); Note, The Bail
Reform Act of 1966, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 170 (1967); Note, Bail Pending Appeal in
Federal Court: The Need for a Two-Tiered Approach. 57 Tex. L. Rev. 275 (1979); see
also Ervin, The Legislative Role in Bail Reform. 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1967);
Freed & Wald, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner's Primer. 52 A.B.A.J.
940 (1966); Note, Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems. 20 'and. L. Rev.
948 (1967). Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure complements the Bail
Reform Act and establishes broad guidelines for release, forfeiture of bail. exonera-
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ernment, the principal-defendant, and the surety. 10 In assuming lia-
bility, the surety enters into a contract with the government by which
the surety guarantees that the bail bond principal will appear and
answer in court." If the surety fails to produce the principal at the
appointed time, a default will be entered and the principal will forfeit
his collateral to the surety. The surety, in turn, will be financially
liable for the principal's non-appearance.' 2  The issue arising in the
federal bail bond cases concerns the interpretation of the language of
the bail bond contract. 13 The controversy typically centers on the
tion of the surety, and supervision of defendants pending trial. Fed. R. Crim. P.
46(a)-(g). The main purpose of the Bail Reform Act is to make it easier for indigents
and petty offenders to obtain bail. See H.R. Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1966] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 229.3, 2295-96; notes 88-89 infra
and accompanying text.
10. United States v. Martinez, 613 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Miller, 539 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. D'Anna, 487
F.2d 899, 900 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Jackson, 465 F.2d 964.
965 (10th Cir. 1972); Williams v. United States, 444 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); United States v. Wray, 389 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (W.D.
Mo. 1975).
11. This contract takes the form of an appearance bond, which is a contract in-
volving the surety and the government. See note 10 supra. It should be strictly
construed in accord with its own terms. United States v. Kelley, 38 F.R.D. 320, 321
(D. Colo. 1965). A money bond should be imposed only after the court has exhausted
all nonfinancial conditions provided for by the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1)-(5)
(1976); Kennedy, A New Approach to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal
Code and Bail Reform, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 424 (1980). For the content of a
typical bond, see Fed. R. Crim. P. (Form 17).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lujan, 589 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 919 (1979); United States v. Brizuela, 551 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1970); Babb v. United States, 414 F.2d
719 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Caro, 56 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Fla. 1972). District
courts have broad discretion in determining whether to provide relief for forfeitures
stemming from a breach of bond conditions. Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(e)(2); see, e.g.,
United States v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gray.
568 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Nolan, 564 F,2d
376, 378 (10th Cir. 1977). Factors taken into consideration by the court include the
willfulness of the breach, the role of the bondsman in the arrest, the prejudice to tile
government, and any mitigating factors. United States v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380, 382
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Nell, 515 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. ,Casanova, 472
F.2d 1223, 1223 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254,
1257 (7th Cir. 1969); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1966).
Moreover, the surety has the option of arresting the defendant and surrendering him
to the court. See United States v. Catino, 562 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1977). But see
McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965) (abuse of discretion
subjected bail bondsman to liability).
13. These interpretations have been widely divergent. For example, the Fifth
Circuit, in United States v. Miller, 539 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), applied
federal common law as the choice of law. The defendant in Miller was tried and
convicted for assaulting an FBI agent and thereafter pleaded guilty to other charges.
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liability of the surety: does the liability continue automatically, or
only with the express consent of the surety throughout the various
stages of a criminal proceeding; 14 does it continue only until pro-
nouncement of sentence by the trial court,' 5 or does it continue
throughout the appellate process.' 6
After sentencing, the trial court allowed a brief stay prior to incarceration and tile
defendant failed to appear. The court held that even though the contract was silent
on the subject, the surety's liability "may be extended to cover reasonably brief post-
ponements of the execution of sentence." Id. at 449; see 1977 Mercer L. Rev. 9S7.
Following this rationale the Second Circuit, in United States v. Catino. 562 F.2d I
(2d Cir. 1977), applied federal law and held that the language of the bail bond
agreement encompassed any appellate review of the defendant's conviction, hi. at
3-4. On the other hand, in United States v. Dinneen, 577 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1978),
although federal common law also was applied, the court rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's extension of Miller and concluded that the sureties' liability under a bail bond
does not continue throughout the appellate process. Id. at 921. It held that the
sureties' liability was limited to "brief, reasonable stays of execution of sentence." hi.
at 922. In the recent decision of United States v. Carr. 608 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1979).
the issue was whether the bond covered the conditions of release after the defend-
ant's indictment or whether the sureties had limited their undertaking to the pre-
indictment period. The court, applying federal law. held that the sureties guaranteed
that the defendant would appear throughout the criminal proceedings. or until the
sureties' obligations under the bail bond contract were terminated, hi. at 8S8-89.
Most recently, in United States v. Martinez, 613 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1980). the Third
Circuit, although not ruling on the choice of law decision, rejected the Dinn'en court
limitation of Miller and followed Catino in holding a surety liable under the bond
contract. Id. at 478-82. In reaching its conclusion, the court turned to the "principles
of contract law governing the interpretation of bail bonds." hd. at 477; see note 66
infra and accompanying text. An examination of the federal courts that have applied
state law to the interpretation of federal bail bond contracts also evinces a wide di-
vergence in outcome. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. D'Anna.
487 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1973), applied Michigan common law to a short stay of execu-
tion and held that sentencing terminated the sureties' liability, hi. at 901. A similar
result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gonare, 415 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1969). But see United States v. Vera-Estrada, 577 F.2d 598. 599 (9th Cir.
1978) (indicating that Gonware dictum for the application of state law was not con-
trolling but not deciding whether it should be followed). In United States v. Wray.
389 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mo. 1975), however, a Missouri district court, faced with a
fact pattern similar to the one in D'Anna. applied Missouri law but held the sureties'
liability continued after sentencing. Id. at 1193. The Wray court distinguished
D'Anna on the language of the bail bond contract. hi. at 1192. This Note %ill not
analyze the substantive law of federal bail bond interpretation. For an analysis of the
substantive law of bail bond contracts, see Annot., 24 A.L.R. Fed. 580, 607-11
(1975-); 8 C.J.S., Bail § 79g (1962).
14. United States v. Carr, 608 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1979).
15. United States v. Miller, 539 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United
States v. D'Anna, 487 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). United States v. Con-
ware, 415 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Wray, 389 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D.
Mo. 1975).
16. United States v. Martinez, 613 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dinneen, 577 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Catino, 562 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1977); Ewing v. United States, 240 F. 241 (6th Cir. 1917). A defendant's eligibility
19801
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Some federal courts have held that the liability of a surety on a
federal bail bond contract should be determined by the law of the
state in which the bail bond agreement was made, 17 while other fed-
eral courts have held that the substantive issues of the litigation
should be determined by resort to federal law.18 In reaching these
conclusions, the courts confronted with a choice of law problem in
the area of bail bond interpretation have not adequately analyzed the
sufficiency of the federal interest. The courts that have chosen state
law have relied on precedents that were based on a statute, no longer
a law of the United States, that mandated the application of state
law.' 9 Those courts that have chosen federal law have merely de-
termined that federal interests are present without ascertaining
whether those interests are, in fact, sufficient. 20
This Note will discuss the conceptual underpinnings of choice of
law principles; examine some leading choice of law decisions; identify
those factors that must be present to constitute a clear and substantial
federal interest; and finally, in applying those factors, show that the
absence of a clear and substantial federal interest in federal bail bond
cases mandates, as the choice of law, the application of state law.
I. GENERAL CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES
An examination of the nature of the relationship between the na-
tional government and the states sheds light on the choice of law
for bail pending appellate disposition of his case is governed by 18 U.S.C. 9 3148
(1976), which provides a federal court with express guidelines for protecting the de-
fendant's interests as well as those of the community. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3146
(1976) (pertaining to release in noncapital cases prior to trial and to post-conviction
bail).
17. E.g., United States v. Marquez, 564 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
United States v. D'Anna, 487 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v.
Gonware, 415 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1969); Swanson v. United States, 224 F.2d 795 (9th
Cir. 1955); Heine v. United States, 135 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1943); Palermo v. United
States, 61 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 600 (1933); Ewing v.
United States, 240 F. 241 (6th Cir. 1917); United States v. Bussey, 452 F. Supp, 891
(M.D. La. 1978); United States v. Wray, 389 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
18. E.g., United States v. Carr, 608 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Dinneen, 577 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Catino, 562 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Miller, 539 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
19. 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1940). Procedures and conditions for obtaining ball are now
governed by the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3143, 3146-3152, 3568
(1976). Former § 591 was interpreted as mandating the application of state law to aid
in the interpretation of federal bail bonds. See Heine v. United States, 135 F.2d 914,
916 (6th Cir. 1943); Western Sur. Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.
1934); Palermo v. United States, 61 F.2d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1932); National Stir. Co.
v. United States, 29 F.2d 92, 99 (9th Cir. 1928).
20. See note 18 supra; pt. II infra.
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problem facing federal courts. Our federal structure is grounded upon
a division of power between the central government and the states.21
This division is based upon the premise that the federal government
is a government of enumerated powers limited to the authority dele-
gated to it by the Constitution, while the states, under the tenth
amendment, 22 are governments of residual powers retaining all au-
thority not specifically granted to the nation.2 "National action has
thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion
to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary
case. . . The political logic of federalism thus supports placing the
burden of persuasion on those urging national action." 24
There are certain areas, however, in which the Constitution forbids
the states to act and grants exclusive power to the federal govern-
ment.25 In these areas, there is little doubt that state action is pre-
cluded and federal law applies. 26 On the other hand, the tenth
amendment reserves to the individual states certain powers not dele-
21. "[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both
exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, vithin their respec-
tive spheres." Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). See Diamond,
The Federalist on Federalism: 'Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a
Composition of Both," 86 Yale L.J. 1273 (1977).
22. U.S. Const. amend. X. "The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the con-
stitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); see note 27 infra and accompanying
text.
23. B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 45-51 (2d ed. 1979); see L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law §§ 2-3, 5-1 to 5-3, 5-7 to 5-9, 5-20 to 5-22 (1978). See generally S.
Davis, The Federal Principle (1978); D. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from
the States (1966); Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L.J. 1019 (1977).
24. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543,
544-45 (1954); see Rules of Decision, supra note 1. at 1446. See also Adopting State
Law, supra note 1, at 826.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 prohibits the states from regulating specific areas.
These prohibitions primarily involve foreign trade or relations. Id.
26. E.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (foreign affairs); Board of Trus-
tees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933) (foreign commerce). Congress, how-
ever, does have the power to designate state law as the applicable law governing a
particular area of legislation. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1976) ("law of the place where the act or omission occurred" is controlling); Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1976) (explicit reference to state law as to who
is a "wife, husband, widow or widower" of an insured). See also Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (statute explicitly provided for state
definition of real property). Under such circumstances, state law does not operate of
its own force but is "incorporated" as the federal rule of decision. See note 2 supra.
1980]
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gated to the United States.2 7 In these areas, federal governmental
regulation is limited and state law controls.2 8
Between these poles of exclusive federal competency and exclusive
state competency are grey areas in which both the federal govern-
ment and state governments are at liberty to regulate. 29 In these
instances, if federal legislation governs the particular issue in dispute
and the state law conflicts with that federal legislation, 30 the supren-
acy clause 3 ' mandates the preemption of the conflicting state law. 32
27. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
28. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state and local govern-
ments). See generally Michelman, State's Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165 (1977).
29. Daniel Webster once contended that when the federal government regulates
a given area, state regulation purporting to govern the same area is invalid. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8-18 (1824) (argument of Daniel Webster).
The Court, however, will sanction state regulations that supplement federal efforts.
E.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714, 722-24 (1963) (state statute barring discriminatory hiring upheld); California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (upholding state prohibition of transportation not
licensed by ICC).
30. The displacement of state law is justified if the state rule frustrates any pur-
pose of the federal legislation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 139 (1973); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continen-
tal Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 724 (1963); Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247,
253-55 (1947).
31. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides that "[this Con-
stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .'. any Thing on the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
32. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942);
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank,
295 U.S. 209, 213-14 (1935); West v. Harris, 573 F.2d 873, 880-81 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979). The rule of preemption, first stated in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), is the vehicle used to challenge
state legislation that conflicts with a granted power exercised by Congress. See J.
Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 267-70 (1978). In
discussing the Congressional power to regulate commerce, the Court in Cooley
stated that subjects that "are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress." 53 U.S. (12 How.) at .319. Such legislation will be
deemed exclusive if that is expressly stated either in a federal statute or in the stat-
ute's legislative history. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1956); Schwabacher v. United States,
334 U.S. 182, 197 (1948). A federal court must commence its analysis, however,
under the assumption that state law is not to be superseded by the Federal Act. Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Preemption "prevents the vagaries of state law from dis-
rupting the national scheme, and guarantees a national uniformity that enhances the
effectiveness of Congressional policy." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 584
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When, however, extensive federal regulation exists in the area, but
the legislation does not directly address the precise issue involved in
the litigation, the court is faced with a choice of law problem. It is in
this situation that the Rules of Decision Act 3 3 governs.
The Rules of Decision Act provides that "'[tihe laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply."' 34  The Act, which articulates the policy
of our federalism, provides that state law should govern litigation aris-
ing in federal courts, and requires that new extensions of federal
(1979). Even in the absence of express congressional recognition that the federal reg-
ulation in question was intended to be exclusive, federal preemption may be found
by implication. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). for exam-
ple, the Court stated that "[the Congressional] purpose mnay be evidenced in several
ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it .... Or the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Id. at 230.
(citations omitted). A state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a
valid federal statute, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151. 158 (1978). espe-
cially "where compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossi-
bility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 142-43 (1963),
or where the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purpose and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52. 67
(1941) (footnote omitted). For an analysis of preemption, see Note. A Fraimeirorkfor
Preemption Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 363 (1978).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976); see, e.g.. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,
465-66 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). See generally Redish & Phillips. Erie and the
Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilennma. 91 Harv. L. Rev. 356
(1977). The Rules of Decision Act has been labeled a "major choice-of-law provision
in the federal structure." Robertson v. Wegmann. 436 U.S. 584, 597 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) (emphasis added). Use of federal common law as the
choice of law has its origin in the "exception" to the Rules of Decision Act. The
"exception" provides that if the source of the controversy is federal, "tie Constitution
or Treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress" may otherwise require the
displacement of state law as the rule of decision. United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Adopting State Late, supra note 1. at 826. See generally
Redish & Phillips, supra note 33. In discussing the exception in the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, Justice Blackmun, in Robertson v. Wegmann. 436 U.S. 584 (1978). stated
that "[tihe exception has not been interpreted in a crabbed or wooden fashion, but,
instead, has been used to give expression to important federal interests." Id. at 598




power be promulgated by the legislature rather than the judiciary.35
The interpretation of the Act in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"° over-
turned the longstanding doctrine that the federal courts were free to
disregard state decisions in matters of "general law" and could apply a
"general federal common law." 3 7
Despite Erie's pronouncement that no general body of federal
common law exists, courts have developed a substantial body of
specialized federal common law. 38 The real question, therefore, in-
35. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 814 n.64; see Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 497-98 (1954).
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court announced in broad terms
the general rule for resolving a choice of law question: "Except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State." Id. at 78. Federal cases can be divided into two categories.
In the first category are those cases that derive federal jurisdiction from diversity of
citizenship and to which the Erie doctrine applies. In the second category are those
cases deriving federal jurisdiction from a source other than diversity of citizenship
where the Erie doctrine does not apply directly to all aspects of the litigation. Hill,
State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 66, 66
(1955). It has been contended that the Erie doctrine "implicates . . . the very es-
sence of our federalism." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693,
695 (1974) (footnote omitted); see C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts
255 (3d ed. 1976); Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 Tex.
L. Rev. 509, 519 (1962); Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie
Versus Hanna, 52 Cornell L.Q. 377, 380 (1967). See generally Redish & Phillips,
supra note 33; Thomas, Erosion of Erie in the Federal Courts: Is State Late Losing
Ground?, 1977 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 10; Wechsler, supra note 24; Wright, The Federal
Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne L. Rev. 317 (1967);
Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1010 (1978).
37. 304 U.S. at 78. Prior to Erie, the federal courts had the power to frame a
"general law" for the vast majority of common law issues presented to them under
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Heckman, Uniform Commercial Late in
the Nineteenth Century Federal Courts: The Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doc-
trine, 27 Emory L.J. 45 (1978); Teton, The Story of Sift v. Tyson, 35 I11. L. Rev.
519 (1941). Erie ended the so-called regime of "general law" and articulated the
general policy of focusing on the appropriate source of authority as to an issue pre-
sented to a court, whether state or federal. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 798-99. Sub-
sequent Court decisions that have interpreted Erie have urged that federal law
should apply only when "the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of
federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by
federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law." Sola Elee.
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); see Prudence Realization Corp.
v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289,
294-96 (1941); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1939).
38. Despite the apparent rejection of a federal general common law in Erie, the
Supreme Court later indicated that there remained a large area of "independent fed-
eral judicial decision" both within and without the realm of constitutional law. United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1947); see, e.g., Illinois v. MiI-
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volves ascertaining the circumstances in which a federal court may
displace the presumed state law with specialized federal common law.
The Supreme Court's major federal common law cases 39 reveal that
to apply a specialized federal common law, a court must determine
that the magnitude of a federal interest is sufficient to override the
"preference for choosing state law . . . embodied in the Rules of De-
cision Act or extracted from the Constitution's structuring of the fed-
eral system." 40  The Fifth Circuit has aptly summarized the princi-
ples of our federal system of government.
As demonstrated by its progeny, Erie requires (1) that federal law
apply in areas of exclusive federal competence, (2) that state law
apply in areas of exclusive state competence, and (3) that state law
apply in areas of concurrent federal-state competence unless (a)
federal legislation or regulation directly addresses the precise and
narrow issue of dispute or (b) the application of federal law is re-
quired to protect or to effectuate a valid and substantial federal
interest or policy.
41
waukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (interstate water pollution); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (federal relationship between a soldier and the government);
United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 'U.S. 256 (1947) (public lands dispute); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal commercial paper); Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (a treaty). Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (rights in interstate
streams). See generally Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Con mon Late, 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1975); Newman, The Federal Common Law. 26 Dicta 303 (1949); Note,
Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Counmon Late, 59 Harv. L.
Rev. Q66 (146); 43 Fordham L. Rev. 1078 (1975); see also Note, Federal Housing
Loans: Is State Mortgage Law Preempted?, 19 Santa Clara L. Rev. 431 (1979); 49
N.C.L. Rev. 358 (1971); 23 Vand. L. Rev. 1384 (1970); 17 Wayne L. Rev. 178 (1971).
Judge Friendly has labeled the body of federal common law "a new centripetal tool
incalculably useful to our federal system." Friendly, supra note 1. at 421.
39. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580 (1973); Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966);
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
40. Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1127 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (Fay,
J., concurring); see United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,
591-92 (1973); Hart, supra note 34, at 534, Mishkin, supra note 1, at 814 n.64;
Wechsler, supra note 24, at 544-45; Federal Common Late. supra note 1, at 1517-31;
notes 21-35 supra and accompanying text.
41. First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First S. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71,
73 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The determination of the nature of the federal interest implicated in
any controversy is the cornerstone of federal common law analysis.4 2
II. SUFFICIENT FEDERAL INTEREST
A court facing a choice of law problem must, as a threshold issue,
determine whether specific interests of the federal government are
involved in the litigation. 43 There is a governmental interest when
the subject of the controversy has a federal source,4 4 or when the
United States is a party to the litigation. 45 These determinations,
however, are "only the beginning, not the end, of the analysis." 4 0
The presence of any one of these elements may justify the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, but they do not in themselves justify the appli-
cation of federal law. Although federal bail bonds arise under federal
legislation and the United States is a party to the litigation, 47 the
42. This determination should be the first step of the choice of law analysis. See
note 2 supra. Major federal common law cases, however, have not effectively sepa-
rated the two steps of the choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Washington Steel Corp.
v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland
Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Highway & City Freight Drivers Local 600
v. Gordon Transp., Inc., 576 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002
(1978); United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 293 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962).
43. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979); Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29 (1977); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 346
(1966); First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First S. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71,
73-74 (5th Cir. 1980).
44. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
46. American Invs-Co Countryside, Inc. v. Riderdale Bank, 596 F.2d 211, 217
(7th Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Wallis v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S, 341
(1966); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); cf.
Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1125 (5th Cir. 1980) (Fay, J. concur-
ring) ("The first step should be a determination of whether the subject area is one
traditionally left to state control, not whether the source of right is state or federal.").
Some ill-reasoned cases have expanded the definition of a federal source and have
indicated that because the United States is a party, United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d
996, 998 (9th Cir. 1979), or because the controversy touches upon a federal program,
United States v. Glover, 453 F. Supp. 659, 662 (W.D. Okla. 1977), application of
federal law is mandated. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1966), however, clearly invalidates this analysis.
47. There is one authority in the federal bail bond interpretation cases that
suggests that federal law should be chosen simply because the government's right to
release prisoners on bail is derived from a "federal source." United States v. Carr,
608 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir. 1979).
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court must still undertake the resolution of the "ultimate issue," 48
whether a "clear and substantial interest" of the federal government
is threatened with "major damage" by the application of state law. 49
The Court has not explicitly articulated a specific test for what con-
stitutes a "clear and substantial federal interest;" nevertheless, two
general themes have emerged from the major choice of law decisions
to indicate whether a federal interest is so "clear and substantial" as
to compel the protection of federal law. One method necessitates the
determination of whether the federal interest involved can only be
effectuated by resort to a uniform rule to avoid "exceptional uncer-
tainty." 50  Another factor that has been considered is whether the
use of state lav would significantly conflict \with any substantial fed-
eral policy or interest. 51 This analysis is sometimes phrased in terms
of whether the controversy in question "is one arising from and bear-
ing heavily upon a federal regulatory program." 5 2  Only when one of
the above elements exists will the federal interest be deemed so clear
and substantial as to mandate the displacement of state law as the'
governing force of the litigation.
48. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 346 (1966).
49. Id. at 352. This analysis should be utilized in the initial choice of law decision
by the federal courts. It has been suggested by one court that because the choice of
law is usually found to be federal law, courts finding that the source of the right is
state law, probably "move into standard preemption analysis." Georgia Power Co. v.
Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1126 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980). Federal interests have been
deemed sufficient to warrant the protection of federal law in cases concerning the
validity of sovereign acts of a foreign power, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 425-29 (1964); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958), tax determi-
nation, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 48 (1958) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 551 (1953); United States v. Pelzer, 312
U.S. 399, 403 (1941); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940), labor law,
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). bankruptcy, see, e.g.,
Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325, 328 (1943); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924); Highway & City Freight Drivers v. Gordon Transp.,
Inc., 576 F.2d 1285, 1288 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 1002 (1978), a treat) ,
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947); Jackson v. Harris, 43 F.2d 513. 516
(10th Cir. 1930), the apportionment of interstate waters, Connecticut v. Mas-
sachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931), interstate pollution, Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101-08 (1972), and the regulation of the mail. Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 303-04 (1977). See generally Mishkin, supra note 1, at 800
n.15; Adopting State Law, supra note 1, at 824-25. On the other hand, federal in-
terests were not sufficient to displace state law in cases concerning breach of con-
tract, Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29, 31-32 (1977), federal commercial
paper, Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34
(1956), and Small Business Administration transactions. United States v. Yazell. 382
U.S. 341, 358 (1966).
50. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 318 U.S. 363. 367 (1943).
51. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). see note 67
infra and accompanying text.
52. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.. 412 U.S. 580. 592 (1973),
quoted in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.. 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979); see United




The Court first considered whether the application of a uniform
rule would be necessary to effectuate the legislative policy or interest
in the landmark decision of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. a
The underlying controversy centered on the issuance of a check by
the federal government for services performed pursuant to federal
legislation. Faced with the question of whether to apply federal law
or Pennsylvania law to the substantive legal issues involved,5 4 the
Court considered whether the federal interest could only be effec-
tuated by the application of a uniform rule.55 This test focuses on
whether the "absence [of uniformity] would threaten the smooth
functioning of those consensual processes that federal . . . law is
chiefly designed to promote." 56
53. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The major contribution of Clearfield was the "clear es-
tablishment of power in the federal courts to select the governing law in matters
related to going operations of the national government." Mishkin, supra note 1, at
833. The decision, however, did not clarify the distinction between competence to
choose the governing federal or state law and the actual choice. id. Mishkin has
postulated that Clearfield's rationale should be applied "to any issue bearing a sub-
stantial relation to an established national government finction." Id. at 801 (footnote
omitted). Clearfield established the general and somewhat vague rule that where
there is a federal interest requiring uniformity for purposes of administrative ease,
federal law is the appropriate choice of law. 318 U.S. at 367. This rule has been
criticized by numerous commentators. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-32; Federal
Common Law, supra note 1, at 1529-31; Adopting State Law, supra note 1, at 831 u.
51.
54. The Court looked to the substantive legal issues involved, the forgery of gov-
ernment issued commercial paper, and noted that "[when the United States dis-
burses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or pow-
er .... The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the
statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsyl-
vania or of any other state .... The duties imposed upon the United States and tile
rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal
sources." 318 U.S. at 366 (citations omitted).
55. The Court in Clearfield concluded that "[t]he issuance of commercial paper
by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to
payment will commonly occur in several states. The application of state law, even
without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of
the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in re-
sults by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several
states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain." 318 U.S. at 367. The question of
whether uniformity is necessary is often determined with reference to the purpose of
the federal legislation. In United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941), for example,
the Court stated that "the revenue laws are to be construed in the light of their
general purpose to establish a nationwide scheme of taxation uniform in its applica-
tion. Hence their provisions are not to be taken as subject to state control or limita-
tion unless the language or necessary implication of the section involved makes its
application dependent on state law." 312 U.S. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
56. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
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Although the Court in Clearfield found a need for uniformit%.,5 7 the
application of divergent state rules to issues arising under federal
legislation does not necessarily subject the rights and duties of the
United States to destructive uncertainty. 58 A court must ascertain
the policies fostered by the federal legislation in question and apply
state law when the federal interests are not so substantial as to war-
rant the protection of federal law. 5 9  In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 60 for example, the question presented was whether federal or
state law should govern the time limitation of Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, which confers jurisdiction upon the
federal district courts over suits concerning collective bargaining con-
tracts. 61 In rejecting the application of federal law the Court noted
that
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote . . . the formation
of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes
under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play
57. 318 U.S. at 367.
58. Later cases have not rested their decisions solely on Clearfiel's uniformity
argument. Thus, the Court has refused to extend the federal preference to suits
simply because the subject matter of the controversy was federal commercial paper.
In Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956). a case
involving federal commercial paper, the Court looked beyond the Clearfield uniform-
ity analysis, and questioned whether the application of state law would - 'subject the
rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.' " Id. at 33. In
response to the appellant's argument that uniformity would be fostered by the appli-
cation of federal law, the Court found that no interference with federal interests in
fact existed. Id. at 33-34; see Mishkin, supra note 1. at 833. The Court has also
refused to apply federal common law in a case involving oil and gas leases which
were issued by the federal government under a federal statute, Wallis v. Pan Ameri-
can Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966), or because the United States became a
creditor pursuant to a provision of a federal statute. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341 (1966). Rather the Court has sought to identify the specific nature of the federal
interests involved in deciding whether uniformity alone is sufficient to mandate the
application of federal law. In discussing the need for uniformity for a nationwvide
federal program the Court in Yazell stated that " '[i]t is true that the Small Business
Administration operates throughout the United States, but such fact raises no pre-
sumption of the desirability of a uniform federal rule with respect to the validity of
chattel mortgages in pursuance of the lending program of the Small Business Ad-
ministration. The largeness of the business of the Small Business Administration of-
fers no excuse for failure to comply with reasonable requirements of local law, which
are designed to protect local creditors against undisclosed action by their local
debtors which impair the value of their claims.' " Id. at 347 n. 13 (quoting Bumb v.
United States, 276 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1960)).
59. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 35 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966); UA\V v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966); see note 70 infra and accompanying text.
60. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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only when these processes have already broken down. Lack of uni-
formity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any impor-
tant way the achievement of any significant goal of labor policy. 02
Similarly, although there is a need for uniform rules governing pre-
trial release, there is no need for uniform rules to aid in the interpre-
tation of a bail bond contract. The purpose of the Bail Reform Act is
to enable indigents to obtain bail more readily and to provide credit
for pretrial detention.6 3  The sole "purpose .. . of a bail bond is to
insure the defendant's presence at trial, at the time of conviction, or
at the time of sentencing." 64  The question of the surety's liability is
raised only after the bail process has broken down. 65 Thus, lack of
uniformity in this area is unlikely to frustrate in any important way
the achievement of any significant goal of federal bail reform.66
B. Significant Conflict
Another factor that is indicative of a clear and substantial federal
interest is whether there is a significant conflict between a federal
62. 383 U.S. at 702.
63. See note 9 supra and accompanying text; notes 88-89 infra and accompanying
text.
64. Resolute Ins. Co. v. State, 450 P.2d 879, 880 (Alaska 1969); see United States
v. D'Argento, 339 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1964) (federal bail bond); Reddy v. Snepp,
357 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (D.N.C. 1973) (state bail bond); State v. Sellers, 336 F.
Supp. 816, 818 (D. Iowa 1972) (state bail bond); United States v. Fook Dan Chin,
304 F. Supp. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (federal bail bond).
65. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
66. Not only is uniformity unnecessary to promote federal policy, but as a practi-
cal matter, it is extremely doubtful that there can be uniformity of result in interpret-
ing federal bail bonds because these bonds are negotiated on an individualized basis
and "var[y] from one federal district to another." United States v. Catino, 562 F.2d
1, 2 (2d Cir. 1977). In interpreting bail bond contracts, federal courts must look to
"the plain meaning of the agreement supplemented, if necessary, by any intention of
the parties that may be gleaned from the circumstances." United States v. Martinez,
613 F.2d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted). These two principles of contract
law are noncontroversial. It is the "application of these principles to the facts, that
has divided the federal courts on the question (of] whether bail bonds continue
through appeal." Id. The application of a federal rule cannot result in uniformity
because the fact-finder must look to the plain meaning of the particular agreement,
and to the intent of the parties. United States v. Martinez, 613 F.2d 473, 476 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Carr, 608 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Miller, 539 F.2d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Dudley v. United States, 242
F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1957); Heine v. United States, 135 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir.
1943). Moreover, the same contract principles are employed by courts choosing state
law. E.g., United States v. D'Anna, 487 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
United States v. Gonware, 415 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1969); Heine v. United States,
135 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1943); Palermo v. United States, 61 F.2d 138, 142 (8th
Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 600 (1933); United States v. Wray, 389 F. Supp,
1186, 1190 (W.D. Mo. 1975). Whether applying federal or state law, such'factual
determinations, by their very nature, cannot be uniform.
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policy or interest and the use of state law. 67  Although the Court has
recently looked to whether the controversy "is one arising from and
bearing heavily upon a federal regulator , program," 68 it has analyzed
the same factors that it had in determining whether there is a sig-
nificant conflict between use of state law and a federal policy or in-
terest. 69  The language has changed, but the analysis has remained
the same.
A significant conflict analysis focuses on the nature of the federal
interest, the hostility of state law, and the legislative intent underly-
ing the enactment of the program. 70 "[TIhere can [, however,] be no
67. The Supreme Court in Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.. 3184 U.S. 63
(1966) stated that "[in deciding whether rules of federal common law should be
fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises must first be
specifically shown." Id. at 68 (emphasis added). Wallis indicates that state law should
be presumed to govern in the initial choice of law decision unless federal interests
would be undermined. Id.; see Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 1517-31;
Adopting State Law, supra note 1, at 824-27. A significant conflict was found in
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). The issue in
Little Lake was whether a state statute should govern federal land acquisitions under
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. The state statute wvas found to conflict with the
federal land acquisition program. Thus, the federal government's contractual interest
in its mineral rights and the need for certainty in land transactions \warranted the
application of federal law. Id. at 603-04.
68. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580. 592 (1973).
quoted in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979).
69. The Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979),
concluded that "federal interests [were] sufficiently implicated to warrant the protec-
tion of federal law," id. at 727 (footnote omitted), and considered three essential
factors: first, the controversy involved the Small Business Administration and Farm-
ers Home Administration, which "'unquestionably perform federal functions." sec-
ond, "the agencies derive[d] their authority to effectuate loan transactions from
specific Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a 'constitutional function or
power;'" and third, the governmental activities "' [arose] from and [bore] heavily
upon [those federal programs].' " Id. at 726-27.
70. The significant conflict factor is also employed in preemption analysis, an area
which the Court, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), has recently
recognized is conceptually similar to the choice of law problem. Citing a leading
choice of law decision, the Court in Hisquierdo stated that there must be "' major
damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will
demand that state law be overridden." Id. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). Preemption analysis supplies courts facing choice of law prob-
lems with a framework in which to examine whether a federal interest is sufficient to
rebut the presumption that state law applies. The Supreme Court has formulated
analytical standards for preemption decisions. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Among the different criteria used by the Court are
expressions such as "conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; differ-
ence; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment, and interference." 312
U.S. at 67 (footnotes omitted). A federal statute is exclusive if the scheme of federal
regulation is so "pervasive" that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
it, if the statute deals with a subject in which the federal interest is dominant, or if
enforcement of the state statute would interfere with administration of the federal
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one crystal clear distinctly marked formula'' 71 or simplistic constitu-
tional standards for defining the parameters of the initial choice of law
issue. A case-by-case approach focusing on the federal interests impli-
cated is necessary72 because "[t]he scope of judicial lawmaking varies
inversely with the clarity of the policies discernible from the statute
and its legislative history." 73
This approach was originally enunciated in Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp.74 The question before the Court was whether fed-
eral or state law should govern oil and gas leases validly issued under
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.7- Although the Court found that
the Mineral Leasing Act governed the issuance of leases among com-
peting applicants, controlled the actual use of the leased tract to pro-
mote conservation and safety, and dealt with royalty payments to the
government, it found that none of the provisions of the Act dealt with
the question at hand, the rights of the parties dealing in the
leases. 76 Thus, the Court could "find nothing in the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 expressing policies inconsistent with state law in the area
[of controversy]." 77 The lack of a "significant threat to any identifi-
able federal policy or interest" 78 mandated the use of state law as the
choice of law.7 9
program. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956). Both preemption and
choice of law analyses foster the presumption that the common and statutory law of
the state is to be applied. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581-83 (1979).
"" The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.' " New York State
Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973), (quoting Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)); see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 642, 617,
653 (1975). Both concepts involve the determination of the nature of the federal
interest necessary to override state law. Compare Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.
25 (1977) (choice of law) with City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.S. 624 (1973) (preemption).
71. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (preemption case).
72. Note, Federal Housing Loans: Is State Mortgage Law Preempted?, 19 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 431, 432 (1979). Our federalism, which the Rules of Decision Act
expresses, mandates such an approach. See notes 21-35 supra and accompanying
text. "[E]ach case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal reg-
ulatory scheme in question." City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.S. 624, 638 (1973) (preemption case).
73. Competence of Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1090.
74. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
75. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
76. 384 U.S. at 69.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Another important consideration in the Court's decision was the recognition
that despite the existence of "related federal legislation in an area ... it must be
remembered that 'Congress acts ...against the background of the total corpus Jurls
of the states .... .'" Id. (quoting H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 435 (1953)). It is against that background that the initial Choice of
law decision must be made.
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Similarly the lack of a significant conflict did not require federal law
protection in Miree v. DeKaIb County.80  The Court in .1iree held
that the state law was applicable in a breach of contract action against
the county by survivors of deceased airline passengers. 8' Despite
the existence of a "substantial" federal interest in the regulation of air
travel and the promotion of air travel safety, the Court held that an%"
federal interest involved in the resolution of the specific breach of
contract action in the case at bar was speculative 82 and that only the
rights of private litigants were at issue.8 3 Furthermore, no sub stan-
tial rights or duties of the United States "hinge[d] on [the] outcome"
of the litigation 84 because "the cause of action [was] not so intimately
related to the purpose of the Airport and Airway Development Act
.. . as to require the application of federal law." 8 5
The choice of law analysis in federal bail bond controversies -also
must begin with an examination of the underlying policies of the Bail
Reform Act because "I[i]f there is a federal statute dealing with the
general subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a start-
ing point for federal common law." 86 Although the Federal Rules of
80. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
81. The breach of contract action arose from grant contracts between the Federal
Aviation Administration and the county whereby the county agreed to restrict the use
of the land surrounding the airport to activities compatible with aircraft operations.
The petitioners, as third-party beneficiaries, claimed that the county breached those
contracts by maintaining a garbage dump on the land causing the crash of a jet when
birds that were flying from the dump were ingested into the aircraft's engines, hi. at
27.
82. Id. at 32-33.
83. Id. at 30.
84. Id. at 31. The Court noted that even when a federal-state relationship
supplies a background for a particular controversy, the issue of whether to displace
state law in a priviate contract action was primarily a decision for Congress. hi. at 32;
see Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1959).
85. 433 U.S. at 35 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). In United
States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976), the court rejected an
assertion that federal interests were sufficiently implicated to warrant the protection
of federal law because "[tihe purpose [of the Act] is to deter the exploitive manage-
ment of federally-insured projects and the resulting substandard and slum-like hous-
ing conditions that the NHA was designed to eliminate." This result would not be
fostered by the choice of federal law. Id. at 784. Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979), also focuses on the purpose of the federal
legislation. There, when the city of Los Angeles foreclosed on property in which the
Federal National Mortgage Association had an interest, the party to whom the city
conveyed the property brought an action to eject those to whom the Department of
Housing and Urban Development had conveyed the property. The court concluded
that federal law should be applied, reasoning that "[t]o sustain the action of the City
in this case ... would defea[t] the purpose of the National Housing Act." hi. at 179.
Similarly, in Glasco v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1976), afffd, 558 F.2d 179 (3d
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Criminal Procedure and the Bail Reform Act preempt certain areas of
state substantive law governing the availability and issuance of bail
bonds, 87 the legislation does not determine the obligations of the par-
ties under a bail bond contract, that is, the civil aspect. An examina-
tion of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act, as seen in the legislative
history, provides no suggestion that Congress sought to oust state law
entirely from the area of federal bail bonds.
The purpose of [the Bail Reform Act] is to revise existing bail pro-
cedures in the [federal courts] in order to assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending
appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the
public interest. In addition, it will assure that persons convicted of
crimes will receive credit for time spent in custody prior to trial
against service of any sentence imposed by the court. 88
The legislative history of the Act does not disclose whether state or
federal law should be applied to interpret bail bond contracts. It is
evident, however, that the Act did not focus upon the determination
of the specific intent under the contract, but rather on the right of
defendants to gain release from custody and on the conditions of that
release.8 9
Cir. 1977), plaintiff-tenants sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the collection
of rents authorized by the federal agency which regulates the rentals on housing
projects financed under the federal housing program. In choosing to apply federal law
the court noted that "in a case of this kind there is a direct federal interest, not only
in the regulation of rents but also in the financing of the project. It has either loaned
the mortgage funds, or insured the mortgage funds, and has either set a nominal
interest rate or undertaken to pay the difference between such a rate and the actual
rate." Id. at 620. The state law in question, not only involved the federal program,
but undermined the very purpose of the program because "risk[ing] the ability of the
federal government to recover its mortgage loan . . . [and] increas[ing] its . . . liabil-
ity . . . [was] to strike at the federal government itself." Id. Moreover, "in the ab-
sence of a specific overriding federal policy, it would appear that the federal courts
are bound to give effect to the state law." Hill, supra note 36, at 66 (footnote omit-
ted). Rejection of state law, when no federal interest so requires, would be inconsist-
ent with the policy of the Rules of Decision Act. See notes 33-35 supra and accom-
panying text.
87. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
88. H.R. Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1966] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2293, 2295. Prior to the passage of the Bail Reform Act several
commentators had suggested that the most significant problem of the bail system was
the inability of indigents to obtain bail. See Ares & Sturz, Bail and the Indigent
Accused, 8 Crime & Delinquency 12 (1962); Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and the
Right to Bail, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 919 (1963); Note, Bail or Jail, 19 Record 11
(1964).
89. Representative Emanuel Celler further elaborated the purpose of the Act:
"Among the most significant features of the Bail Reform Act proposed is the emphasis
on nonfinancial conditions of release for persons charged with Federal crimes." Fed-
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It is undisputed that a bail bond is a contract between the govern-
inent and the defendant and his surety. 90 If the defendant does not
appear as required under the contract, the court has discretion to
declare a forfeiture upon motion from the government. 91 A motion
initiated by the government to enforce a bond forfeiture is an action
for "damages and is deemed civil, not criminal, in nature." '92 The
proceeding is independent of the underlying prior criminal proceed-
ing. Furthermore, this proceeding only takes place after the de-
fendant has jumped bail; that is, only after the bail processes have
broken down. Thus, the application of state or federal law to the liti-
gation of a contract for money damages does not impinge upon the
penal interests of the federal criminal justice system or interfere with
the purposes underlying the Bail Reform Act.
The extent of the liabilities of each party under a bail bond contract
is dependent upon the language of the undertaking and the intent of
the parties as interpreted under suretyship and contract law. 9A3 The
eral Bail Reform: Hearings on S. 13.57 Before the Subcomu. on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966) (statement of Rep. Celler).
Representative William McCulloch stated that "[ilt is a proposal to modernize the
pretrial release system in our Federal courts.- Id. at 15-16 (statement of Rep.
McCulloch).
90. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
92. United States v. Barger, 458 F.2d 396, 396 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). see
United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1978). United States %.
Zarafonitis, 150 F. 97 (5th Cir. 1907). There is, however, a division of authority as to
whether it is civil for all procedural purposes. See United States %,. Jones. 567 F.2d
965 (10th Cir. 1977) (bond forfeiture proceeding must be filed wsithin stated period
for criminal cases). In an analogous situation, tile Supreme Court has indicated that
state law governs the awarding of attorneys' fees in federal court. Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975). Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949); see. e.g.. Klopfenstein v. Pargeter, 597
F.2d 150, 152 (9th Cir. 1979); Schulz v. Lamb, 591 F.2d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 1978).
Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1003 (5th Cir. 1978). Interformn Co. %. Mitchell.
575 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th Cir. 1978): Michael-Regan Co. v. Lindell, 527 F.2d 6:53,
656 (9th Cir. 1975). The Court in Alyeska Pipeline held that only Congressional legis-
lation could change this result. In response to the decision. Congress. in 1976.
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) which allows attorneys' fees in suits arising under
various federal statutes. Id. In addition, there are at least 75 statutes enacted by
Congress authorizing attorneys' fees. See Berger, Court Atwarded Attoraeyis" Fee .
What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281. 303-04 n. 104 (1977) (listing statutes).
93. Moreover, the application of federal law actually detracts from the stability of
business relationships. In structuring their transactions bail bondsmen depend upon
suretyship and contract law to provide guidance in evaluating potential risks. (.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.. 440 U.S. 715. 739-40 (1979) (1n structuring
financial transactions, businessmen depend on state commercial law to pros ide the
stability essential for reliable evaluation of the risks involved."). The relative clarity of
established state law precedents as compared to uncertain federal commnon law appli-
cation fosters greater predictability, Id. The choice of federal law. enabling a court to
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surety undertakes contractual duties, the breadth of which is deter-
mined by the language of the agreement. 94 The resolution of con-
tractual disputes is far removed from the stated purpose of the Bail
Reform Act and friom the criminal justice system. 95
The only conflict with a government policy or interest that the gov-
ernment can allege in a bond forfeiture proceeding is that the applica-
tion of state law may adversely affect its right to damages as a creditor
under a contract9li and thus significantly conflict with its "federal fis-
cal interests." 97 This bald assertion of a public fiscal interest has met
with little judicial favor in other contexts. 98 In United States v.
Yazell, 99 the Court held that the federal interest in collecting on an
individually negotiated contract did not justify the displacement of
state law. 100 In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that "there
is always a federal interest to collect moneys. . .. The desire of the
Federal Government to collect is understandable. . . . But this serves
merely to present the question-not to answer it. Every creditor has
the same interest in this respect; every creditor wants to collect." 101
Thus, the existence of a federal fiscal interest to collect money under
a bail bond contract is not sufficient to support a finding that the use
of state law will significantly conflict with federal policies or interests.
If the government desires to protect its fiscal interests it may insert
specific contractual provisions to make the intent of the parties
explicit rather than relying on the federal courts to "invent [a federal
common law] and impose it upon the States."' 02 The interpretation
fashion a federal rule from an "incredible variety of materials," Federal Comnon
Law, supra note 1, at 1519, engenders risk and uncertainties for the respective con-
tracting parties.
94. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
95. Another issue that does not affect the stated purpose of the Bail Reform Act is
the issuance and use of a power of attorney authorizing a person to sign a federal bail
bond on behalf of another. In United States v. Bussey, 452 F. Supp. 891 (MD, La.
1978), the court held that the issue is governed "entirely by state law." Id. at 895.
The determination of the power of attorney issue is independent of the initial crini-
nal procedure in securing bail.
96. "Upon forfeiture, the surety becomes the government's debtor." United
States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1978); accord, Western Stir. Co. v.
United States, 51 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1931).
97. United States v. Catino, 562 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1977).
98. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (public fiscal interest not
compelling enough to justify residency requirement for welfare aid); United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1966); United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co.. .5,11
F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1976).
99. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
100. Id. at 348-49.
101. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 353. A factor of critical importance to the Court was that the security
lien in question was the product of an individually negotiated contract. In noting tlt
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of a contract in a civil proceeding, an area traditionally regulated by
the states, should be governed by reference to state law. The federal
interest in the civil forfeiture proceeding must be deemed -specula-
tive" and "remote" 103 and insufficient justification for the displace-
ment of state law.
CONCLUSION
Federal c6urts, faced with choice of law decisions, should com-
mence their analyses with the presumption, founded in the principles
of federalism, that state law provides the governing rule of decision.
Federal law should displace state law only under the circumstances
where clear and substantial federal policies or interests in the out-
come of the controversy necessitate federal law protection. The ab-
sence of a clear and substantial federal interest in federal bail bond
contract interpretations and the threat of major damage to our
federalism mandate the application of state law as the choice of law
and governing rule of decision.
Joseph A. Coco
"[ilt must be assumed that the Small Business Administration maintains competent
personnel familiar with the laws of the various states in which it conducts business,
and who are advised of the steps required by local law in order to acquire a valid
security interest within the various states," 382 U.S. at 347 n.13. the Court con-
cluded that individual negotiation assures that the government has the information
necessary to protect its financial interests. Federal bail bonds are also negotiated on
an individualized basis.
103. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977); Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956).
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